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I.  What Is a Land Bank (and Why Do We Need One)?
Unlike federal land banks, which extend credit to farmers and ranchers, the land banks dis-
cussed in this article are typically established as a vehicle for community development and 
revitalization. A good working deﬁ  nition of a land bank is offered by Frank Alexander, direc-
tor of the Project on Affordable Housing and Community Development at Emory Universi-
ty School of Law, who describes land banks as “governmental [entities] that [focus] on the 
conversion of vacant, abandoned, and tax-delinquent properties into productive use.”1 The 
duties of a land bank generally include assuming the title to tax-delinquent properties, then 
securing, rehabilitating or demolishing, and transferring those properties to responsible de-
velopers or homeowners to ensure the properties are put to use instead of remaining vacant 
or abandoned.2 Policymakers are increasingly considering the land bank model to address 
the problem of vacant and abandoned properties in cities like Cleveland, which has an abun-
dance of vacant housing.
One factor exacerbating the growing number of vacant properties is the high foreclosure 
rate in Cuyahoga County, which has been described as the epicenter of the foreclosure cri-
sis.3 The problem of vacancy touches most of Ohio, which a recent study estimated as having 
more than 15,000 vacant and abandoned buildings and nearly 10,000 vacant and abandoned 
lots across a handful of cities.4 In fact, the foreclosure crisis has exacerbated a longer-term 
trend of increased housing vacancy driven in part by Cleveland’s population decline.5 
Vacant and abandoned properties are not readily absorbed by housing demand in cities 
that are losing population. In the greater Cleveland metropolitan area, for example, permits 
for new construction outpaced population growth by nearly 50 percent from 1990 to 2000.6 
Because most of this new growth occurred outside of the city and inner-ring suburbs, those 
core areas were left with higher concentrations of vacant and abandoned housing.7 Looking 
ahead, even after foreclosures return to lower levels, cities like Cleveland will continue to 
face the challenges of concentrated areas of vacant and abandoned housing. 
Why is this issue such a challenge for municipalities? Studies have shown that vacant 
and abandoned buildings are magnets for criminal activity8 and that reducing vacancy sup-
presses criminal activity.9 Thousands of ﬁ  res are also reported in vacant structures each year, 
causing tens of millions of dollars in damage.10 Vacant and abandoned properties also remain 
off tax rolls and lower the value of surrounding properties, further eroding the real property 
tax base.11 Perhaps most signiﬁ  cantly, vacant properties signal that a neighborhood is on the 
decline.12 They undermine a neighborhood’s sense of community and discourage further 
investment.13 Moreover, such disinvestment often spreads across neighborhoods and wors-
ens the overall health of a city.14 For these reasons, neighborhoods, schools, and city govern-
ments bear the greatest costs induced by vacant and abandoned property.15
The process of land banking is not intended to replace the operation of private markets, 
but rather to assist where there is a failure of market conditions.16 Private markets are not 
likely to provide an adequate remedy for this problem and in some cases may aggravate it. 
Private parties have little or no incentive to purchase land when the property taxes owed on 
the land exceed its fair market value.17 Similarly, private parties are very unlikely to purchase 
land with defects on its title, because it is rarely cost-effective to cure title defects.18 When POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 25, JANUARY 2009
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land speculators do purchase and hold tax-foreclosed property, cohesive redevelopment 
plans can be held up or completely prevented. This speculation problem is exacerbated 
when speculators reside out of state, beyond the reach of local jurisdictions. 
An efﬁ  cient land bank, on the other hand, can help municipalities address the costs borne 
by neighborhoods, schools, and city governments by working to reduce vacancy and aban-
donment. For instance, land bank systems can deter harmful land speculation by enabling 
land banks to obtain title to distressed properties before they are offered to the public. Land 
bank systems can also deter harmful tax-lien speculation by enabling land banks to purchase 
tax liens against distressed properties instead of these liens being offered for sale to the 
public. And land banks can ﬁ  ll an important gap in private markets by purchasing undesir-
able land and removing defects on the title, a critical function since property without clear 
title is undesirable to private buyers, who cannot obtain title insurance without clear title. 
Overall, land banks undertake their tasks with the goal of returning distressed properties 
to private entities that will put the land to productive use. If no private interest exists for 
land bank acquisitions, the land can be converted into public green space and donated to 
municipalities. 
II.  Ohio’s Traditional Land Banks
Up until January 2009, the Ohio Revised Code only allowed local authorities to estab-
lish a type of land bank called a land-reutilization program. These land banks typically do 
not pursue tax foreclosures or otherwise take an active role in addressing the problem of 
vacant and abandoned properties. Instead, they are commonly used to hold properties, usually 
vacant lots, in inventory. Established in an earlier era to address a different problem, these 
passive land banks may not be adequately equipped to address the problem facing Ohio 
today. This section will explore the history of Ohio’s traditional land banking system and 
illustrate why it is not suited to address the modern vacancy and abandonment problems fac-
ing communities across the state.
A.  History of Land Banks in Ohio
Passive land banks, or those that simply hold properties for future use, were designed in 
1976 to address widespread tax delinquency. In the mid 1970s, Cleveland’s population de-
clined signiﬁ  cantly, which contributed to more than 11,000 parcels of land becoming tax-
delinquent.19 At the time, tax-foreclosure procedures required that lawsuits be brought 
against property owners rather than against the properties themselves. Because many of 
these tax-delinquent owners had left the jurisdiction, numerous tax foreclosures could not 
be ﬁ  led. To help address the effects of widespread tax delinquency, then, legislators enacted a 
bill in 1976 enabling local authorities, most commonly cities, to create passive land banks.20
The 1976 legislation also modiﬁ  ed tax-foreclosure procedures so that real property tax 
foreclosures were actions against property, rather than against property owners, thus allow-
ing actions against tax-delinquent properties even after owners left the jurisdiction.21 When 
a county foreclosed on a property, the property would then be advertised and offered for 
sale at public auction. If a parcel was not purchased after being offered at two auctions, the 
legislation allowed for passive land banks to receive, manage, and convey the property to 
private third parties.22 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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In 1988, the Ohio legislature modiﬁ  ed the land bank law to permit the abatement of prop-
erty taxes on land held by passive land banks.23 The 1988 legislation also created a dedicated 
fund for the prosecution of delinquent real property taxes.24 A small percentage of delin-
quent real property taxes and assessments is placed in the fund to ﬁ  nance tax-foreclosure 
suits by county prosecutors and to cover passive land bank costs. Finally, the 1988 legisla-
tion altered notice requirements to streamline judicial tax foreclosure proceedings.25 More 
recently, House Bill 294 was passed in 2006 to expedite the tax foreclosure process.26 Under 
the changes made by HB 294, the foreclosure of distressed properties may be adjudicated 
with an administrative hearing rather than through a judicial proceeding. 
B. Challenges Faced by Passive Land Banks
Passive land banks may have worked effectively to address the tax-delinquency problems 
faced by Cuyahoga County in 1976, but they are not fully equipped to address the problems 
Ohio faces today. The fact that passive land banks are municipal programs, rather than sepa-
rate legal entities, has four important implications. First, passive land banks have no operat-
ing budgets or staffs of their own, and most local governments lack the tools necessary to ad-
dress the vacant and abandoned housing problem.27 The limited funding these passive land 
banks receive comes from participating local governments and the housing trust funds avail-
able to support activities related to the transformation of land bank properties.28 Because 
passive land banks lack dedicated staff, time spent on passive land bank issues reduces the 
time and resources that localities can direct to other important issues. 
Second, passive land banks operate only within local governments, so they cannot address 
vacancy and abandonment regionally. This limits the redevelopment planning each program 
can undertake. The spread of urban decay is not bound by city limits. Redevelopment strate-
gies in one municipality will affect those of its neighbors and beyond. Consider that in Frank-
lin County, home to Columbus, a land-reutilization program has been organized at the county 
level, but is unable to actively foreclose on tax-delinquent properties within municipalities 
without their consent.29 This restriction hinders the county’s redevelopment efforts.
Third, because passive land banks are not legal entities, they do not have the power to 
acquire real-estate-owned (REO) properties or contract to upkeep inventoried parcels. These 
actions must be executed at the city level. This lack of leverage creates inefﬁ  ciencies both 
for the parties holding REO properties and for Ohio government, because it forces multiple 
municipal negotiations for the purchase or upkeep of REO properties.
Fourth, because passive land banks are government programs as opposed to separate legal 
entities operating independently from local governments, local governments are exposed to 
legal liability. Under the state’s pre–2009 legislation, local governments bore the legal liability 
for all properties in a land-reutilization program’s inventory. The most distressed properties 
carry with them the most signiﬁ  cant exposure to liability, which may serve to discourage 
effective use of land banks.
Incidentally, passive land banks are limited to taking unimproved land30 unless the struc-
tures on the land are slated for demolition or are unoccupied and acquisition is “necessary 
for the implementation of an effective land reutilization program.”31 The tendency has been 
for passive land banks, such as the one in Cleveland, to acquire only unimproved land.32 A 
couple of driving factors were likely at play: First, the legal liability and costs associated with POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 25, JANUARY 2009
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holding the land may motivate passive land banks to acquire only unimproved land. Second, 
passive land banks do not have the funding to engage in wide-scale rehabilitation or demoli-
tion. These factors demonstrate that passive land banks are designed to address a different 
problem entirely, as many of today’s tax-delinquent properties have buildings in need of 
rehabilitation or demolition located on the parcels.
Passive land banks also take a long time to acquire tax-foreclosed properties. Under Ohio’s 
former land bank legislation, tax-foreclosed property had to go through two public auctions, 
held only a few times a year, before being transferred to passive land banks (and prior to 
being offered at a public auction, the property had to be advertised for 21 days). Even the 
majority of expedited HB 294 foreclosures were required to go through at least one auction 
before they could be transferred.33 Thus, properties acquired by passive land banks some-
times sat vacant for up to nine months after foreclosure and before being transferred to the 
program, allowing plenty of time for such properties to fall into disrepair or to be stripped 
by looters.
Communities that established a countywide land-reutilization program under the previ-
ous law had to contend with the challenges imposed by a cumbersome land-acquisition 
process. To begin with, the requirements that had to be satisﬁ  ed before a land-reutilization 
program could take title to a property limited the types of properties the program could ac-
cess. In the case of the Franklin County Land Reutilization Program, the properties it most 
commonly acquired after being offered at public auction were (1) vacant lots with delin-
quent taxes in excess of property value, (2) abandoned homes or commercial structures, 
and (3) environmentally distressed properties.34 Franklin County could not acquire recently 
vacated or abandoned homes for its land-reutilization program because the Ohio Revised 
Code required that those properties ﬁ  rst be offered for sale at public auctions.
Ohio’s new land banking system addresses the shortcomings detailed above by establish-
ing land banks as separate legal entities with their own staffs, budgets, and independent 
legal status. Land banks organized under the new system will have the resources and ability 
to address the regional problems of vacancy and abandonment more efﬁ  ciently and effec-
tively than former law allowed. Further, they will have the legal independence necessary to 
shelter localities from legal liabilities associated with minimizing the effects of vacant and 
abandoned housing.
Under Ohio’s new and banking system, a county land bank can be organized as a corpo-
ration that is empowered to foreclose on tax-delinquent properties. Once the county land 
bank has title and obtains appropriate municipal permits, it can either contract the proper-
ties for rehabilitation or demolition or sell them to responsible developers. If properties are 
rehabilitated, the county land bank will resell them individually to homeowners. Alternatively, 
county land banks can bundle clusters of acquired properties and sell them to developers. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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III.  How the Land Bank Bill Alters Ohio’s Traditional Land Banking Model
Intended to modernize Ohio’s current land bank system, Senate Bill 353/House Bill 602 (the 
Land Bank Bill) allows for the creation of County Land Reutilization Corporations (CLRCs)—
nonproﬁ   t community improvement corporations authorized by and subject to the Ohio 
Revised Code35—to help acquire, reclaim, rehabilitate, and reutilize vacant land. The bill effective-
ly establishes a pilot land-bank program that, for now, is limited to Cuyahoga County36 and will 
run for two years from the date on which a CLRC is incorporated.37 The land banking system es-
tablished under the Land Bank Bill alters the state’s current model in four signiﬁ  cant ways:
It gives CLRCs the power to regionally address vacant and abandoned housing.  ￿ 
It streamlines the primary method of property acquisition: tax foreclosure. ￿ 
It secures a source of funding for the county land bank without creating new taxes. ￿ 
Finally, it assures that the land bank has the ability to organize as a corporation that is  ￿ 
legally distinct from a local government.
A.  County Land Reutilization Corporations: A Modern Land Banking Model
i. CLRC Powers
The new legislation gives CLRCs both special and traditional corporate powers. Special pow-
ers include the ability to contract with numerous government organizations and county 
boards. Counties will be able to provide CLRCs with all the basics needed to run a business—
data storage, ofﬁ  ce space, etc.—at or below market rates. CLRCs would be empowered to 
contract with municipalities for management of property. Finally, CLRCs would be able to 
initiate foreclose on tax liens.
As an Ohio Revised Code § 1724 corporation, CLRCs have most of the traditional powers 
of corporations.38 Among these are the abilities to develop regional strategies for addressing 
the vacant and abandoned housing problem, negotiate directly for the acquisition of REO 
properties, maintain other entities’ REO properties for a fee, accept properties as gifts or 
donations, purchase properties from individuals, and contract for the rehabilitation or main-
tenance of inventoried properties. Negotiating at the county level with banks or servicers to 
acquire REO properties makes the process more efﬁ  cient for all parties involved. Servicers 
and municipalities within a county will not have to engage in numerous transactions, each 
resulting in the transfer of a handful of distressed REO properties. Instead, a CLRC can negoti-
ate for every distressed REO property in the county. 
As an independent corporation, a CLRC will also have the freedom to decide how to 
dispose of property. This could entail anything from rehabilitation and resale to demolition. 
Because a CLRC is organized to effect land redevelopment, it could vet potential new own-
ers to ensure they are ready to be homeowners. Alternatively, the CLRC could sell to private 
developers who bring forward approved plans to help accomplish long-term community 
development. The CLRC also has the ﬂ  exibility to adapt to new market demands quickly, 
choosing to lease properties, for example, if there were a sudden demand for leased space.39 
The Land Bank Bill thus gives land banks increased independence and ﬂ  exibility.40
As will be discussed more fully in the funding section, CLRCs may borrow money via loans 
or lines of credit and by issuing ﬁ  nancial instruments or securities. They may request that a 
county’s Board of Commissioners pledge a source of revenue to secure a borrowing and is-POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 25, JANUARY 2009
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sue notes in some circumstances. If CLRCs are operating within the boundaries of a city or 
other municipality, they may request that the municipality issue bonds to fund CLRC activi-
ties within those boundaries. The Land Bank Bill also empowers CLRCs to spend money as-
sisting municipalities in abating residential nuisances and to fund prosecutions for violations 
of laws governing real estate, encouraging CLRCs and municipalities to collaborate. 
ii. CLRC Immunities
The Land Bank Bill also grants CLRCs important immunities. Because CLRCs would be in the 
business of acquiring vacant, abandoned, or otherwise distressed real property, they should 
be immune from some regulations. The new law immunizes CLRCs from state environmen-
tal regulations and orders, permits, licenses, variances or plans approved or issued under any 
such regulations. There are, however, some immunities absent from the list that may actually 
beneﬁ  t CLRCs. 
Substantial exposure to liability comes with acquiring nuisance properties.41 The potential 
for nuisance lawsuits is a real possibility between the time when a CLRC acquires a property 
and when that property is rehabilitated, demolished, or sold. Similarly, there is a real possibility 
of successful negligence lawsuits against a CLRC between the time a CLRC acquires title to a 
negligently maintained property and when the property is rehabilitated, demolished, or sold. 
CLRCs would not beneﬁ  t from sovereign immunity because they would be independent 
corporations created by county governments. Thus, it might be wise to provide CLRCs with 
temporary immunity from lawsuits that are based on the condition of the property when it 
was acquired. Such immunity could run from the time of property acquisition by CLRCs un-
til the expiration of a reasonable time necessary to cure the property’s defects.42 While the 
recently enacted Land Bank Bill is a step in the right direction by granting some immunities, 
it could have offered CLRCs further important protections.
iii. Checks and Balances
Granting a CLRC broad powers and immunities renders it a potent redevelopment tool in the 
right hands. Such powers and immunities, however, also raise the question of who or what 
will operate as a check on a CLRC to balance out its powers. In this case, the answer is twofold. 
First, the board of directors of every CLRC will be comprised of three elected ofﬁ  cials and two 
directors appointed by elected ofﬁ  cials and approved by municipalities in the relevant coun-
ties. Thus, voters could change the leadership of a CLRC by electing different ofﬁ  cials. 
Second, municipalities can effectively prevent CLRCs from operating within their borders. 
Although it is not spelled out in the Land Bank Bill, as a pragmatic matter, CLRCs will have to 
work in cooperation with municipalities. The CLRCs will not be able to obtain permits for ac-
tions such as demolition, for example, unless municipalities issue the permits. The Land Bank 
Bill also grants municipalities the right of ﬁ  rst refusal on all tax-delinquent properties within 
their borders. That is, if both a municipality and a CLRC are interested in receiving the same 
parcel of tax-foreclosed land, the municipality takes priority over a land bank.
As community improvement corporations, CLRCs will be subject to further oversight by 
the state auditor.43 Each year, every CLRC will be required to ﬁ  le an annual report with the 
state auditor. Failure to ﬁ  le this report will result in a CLRC’s articles of incorporation being 
cancelled by the Ohio secretary of state, at which point that CLRC would no longer be able 
to function as a corporation or under any special powers it had been granted.44 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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In addition, CLRCs will be subject to regular audits by the state auditor.45 These audits will 
occur at least once every two years. Audits may also occur more frequently, which might be 
desirable to ensure CLRC powers and immunities are not abused.46 These reports and audits 
ensure that the activities of CLRCs are in accord with their purpose of facilitating the reclama-
tion, rehabilitation, and reutilization of vacant, abandoned, and tax-foreclosed land.47 Finally, to 
ensure transparency, CLRCs will be required to keep regular corporate books and records of all 
transactions, including disclosure of prices paid and prices received for each parcel of land.48 
Most notably, the Land Bank Bill imposes unique reporting requirements on CLRCs. No 
more than seven months after incorporation, each CLRC must ﬁ  le a report with the Ohio 
General Assembly summarizing the CLRC’s activities. The report must contain a list of expen-
ditures, revenues, parcels acquired and method of acquisition, among other things.49 A simi-
lar report must be ﬁ  led no more than 13 months after incorporation. Together, these reports 
will provide the legislature with information necessary to evaluate a CLRC’s operations.
These checks should ensure that CLRCs do not abuse the powers and immunities granted 
by the Land Bank Bill. Because CLRCs are granted speciﬁ  c powers, immunities, and exemp-
tions these checks accommodate public oversight and transparency of CLRCs, and continue 
Ohio’s tradition of providing a strong home rule environment for municipalities. 
B. Primary Method of Property Acquisition: Tax Foreclosure
Under the new legislation, land banks’ primary method of property acquisition will contin-
ue to be foreclosure on tax-delinquent properties.50 A land bank cannot focus its acquisition 
strategies directly on vacant and abandoned housing for a few reasons. For one, vacancy is 
difﬁ  cult to ascertain and track. There is also no precise, widely accepted deﬁ  nition for aban-
doned property.  And—in part because of these two factors—no organization currently acts 
as a central information repository to document the location of vacant and abandoned prop-
erties at the county level.51 A county-level data repository would assist in a more regional 
evaluation of the vacant and abandoned housing problem, and may help tailor future strate-
gic redevelopment plans. 
Property-tax delinquency, however, is often a precursor to vacancy and abandon-
ment when it occurs in neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates.52 Emory University’s 
Frank Alexander calls such delinquency “the most signiﬁ   cant common denominator 
among vacant and abandoned properties.”53 A property owner’s decision to stop paying 
taxes, combined with foreclosures in the neighborhood, is often a sign that the owner 
plans no further investment in his residential property.54 
While the primary means of property acquisition remains the same as that of the 
passive land banks, the Land Bank Bill signiﬁ  cantly reduces the time it takes to procure 
vacant or abandoned property. The bill creates an alternative redemption period55 that runs for 
45 days from adjudication of foreclosure, after which the right of equitable redemption ex-
pires. Once the 45 days have passed, the bill allows the parcel to be transferred directly to a 
CLRC without appraisal or sale. These changes address several shortcomings of passive land 
banks, in that this direct-transfer provision prevents speculators from purchasing and hold-
ing land without reinvesting in it.56  The shortened acquisition timeline also helps ensure 
that the property does not fall into disrepair while going through the two public auctions POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 25, JANUARY 2009
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now required by law and reduces the opportunity for vandals to strip the property of copper 
pipe, aluminum siding, storm windows, and other easily sold materials. 
Another important feature of the new law is that it provides a “title cleaning” mechanism 
for all properties that a CLRC acquires. This will make CLRC properties more attractive to 
responsible developers by ensuring the land has a marketable title. The mechanism works by 
automatically extinguishing any other interests in land that is transferred to a CLRC. This is a 
critical function of successful land banks, because without marketable title to a property, po-
tential owners will not be able to obtain title insurance. If title to property cannot be insured, 
it is unlikely that the property will be purchased by either homeowners or developers. 
The new law also updates the regulations governing tax liens and foreclosures in ways 
that beneﬁ  t parties other than CLRCs. For instance, the Land Bank Bill adds a title-clearing 
mechanism to tax foreclosures.57 It also changes the procedures for transferring title to 
properties when the taxes owed exceed the property’s fair market value. Finally, it prevents 
the creation of tax liens in circumstances where owners are attempting to pay off their real 
property tax debts.58 
C. Funding  Mechanisms
Funding is one of the most critical aspects of any active land bank. Wide-scale rehabilitation 
and demolition, both of which may be necessary to address Ohio’s vacant and abandoned 
housing problem, can be very expensive. Without a source of funding, passive land banks 
have limited ability to address the vacancy and abandonment problem facing Ohio. For ex-
ample, a guiding consideration of the Franklin County Land Reutilization Program is mini-
mizing its ﬁ  nancial and stafﬁ  ng impact.59 The new law speciﬁ  es that the primary source of 
funding for CLRCs will be penalties and interest on delinquent real property taxes—which 
means no new taxes.
Previously, county treasurers sold tax certiﬁ  cates to private parties for the amount of the 
delinquent taxes.60 Under the changes in the Land Bank Bill, CLRCs essentially would pur-
chase tax certiﬁ  cates, individually or in bulk, instead of county treasurers offering them for 
sale to private parties. In this way, the Land Bank Bill allows for the public use of an existing 
tax and prevents tax liens from being sold to speculators. Under the funding mechanism 
for CLRCs established by the Land Bank Bill, no new real property taxes or assessments are 
imposed on punctual tax payers. 
It is important to note that tax lien speculators do not capture all interest and penalties 
from delinquent property taxes. Some of these revenues ﬂ  ow to and are used by municipali-
ties. Under the Land Bank Bill, municipalities will continue to receive the principal value of 
delinquent real property taxes and assessments. The penalties and interest, however, will 
now be redirected to CLRCs. 
The Land Bank Bill makes the numerous statutory changes required to create a mechanism 
through which CLRCs can capture interest and penalties, including a revised tax distribution 
schedule. The new mechanism will function by way of the County Treasurer, upon approval 
of the County’s Investment Advisory Committee, borrowing money from the County Trea-
sury. Borrowed money is paid directly to taxing districts in amounts equal to their unpaid or 
delinquent real property taxes and assessments. As those unpaid and delinquent taxes are FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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recovered, the principal amount of the tax goes to pay off the line of credit. The penalties and 
interest are put into an account used to fund CLRCs.61 At the end of the year, monies remain-
ing but unused will be applied to debts incurred to advance payment to taxing districts.62 
This system should operate effectively at the county level because the County Treasurer has 
access to lists of all tax-delinquent properties in the county as well as the amount owed on 
each property.
The changes will allow the line of credit to be funded initially via several methods. First, 
the CLRC can borrow from the County Treasury. Second, if the County Treasury cash ﬂ  ow 
is insufﬁ  cient to fund the new legislation’s revised tax distribution schedule, a line of credit 
with a ﬁ  nancial institution can be used to satisfy the deﬁ  ciency. Finally, the Land Bank Bill cre-
ates an optional mechanism for the creation and sale of delinquent-tax anticipation securi-
ties. These would not be general obligations of the County. Instead, they would be supported 
with only a pledge of revenue from the collection of speciﬁ  cally identiﬁ  ed delinquent real 
property taxes and assessments.
The Land Bank Bill does increase the rate at which interest is calculated on unpaid and 
delinquent taxes and assessments.63 Each month the taxes are delinquent, 1 percent interest 
is charged against the amount owed. Late payment penalties (5% and 10%) remain the same. 
The current Cuyahoga County Treasurer projects that this interest rate increase will generate 
roughly seven million dollars in annual revenue in Cuyahoga County. 
It should be noted that this funding system could also work at the municipal level. Previ-
ously, municipalities could purchase tax certiﬁ  cates from the county and pursue the lower 
interest and penalties for either general or speciﬁ  c use.64 The fact that cities have not been 
doing this may be due to economies of scale. That is, the amount of interest and penalties 
collected by any one municipality, when compared to collection costs, may make pursuing 
the interest and penalties cost prohibitive. Aggregated at the county level, however, pursuing 
the collection of interest and penalties may prove to be cost effective.65 
The Land Bank Bill also allows for numerous possible secondary sources of funding for 
CLRCs. First, CLRCs will capture the proceeds from the sale of any of their urban and subur-
ban properties. This is made possible because CLRCs obtain clear title to land after the alter-
nate redemption period, and because all delinquent taxes and assessments will be advanced 
to taxing districts. Thus, there would be no liens on the land that would entitle any person or 
taxing district to a portion of sale proceeds. 
Second, the bill allows up to 5 percent of the delinquent taxes and assessments collection 
fund to be earmarked for use by a CLRC. This fund was used exclusively for the collection of 
delinquent real property, personal property, and mobile/manufactured home taxes and for 
passive land bank expenses.
Third, a Board of County Commissioners may provide additional funding. Boards are autho-
rized to make contributions to corporations organized under Ohio Revised Code § 1724.66 
Boards are also authorized to levy additional property taxes to help fund CLRCs. Boards may 
also support CLRCs from their general operating tax levies.
Fourth, CLRCs are nonproﬁ  t corporations that can raise money in their own right. They 
can do this by borrowing money, issuing bonds, accepting gifts, and applying in their own 
names for grants.67 CLRCs may grant mortgages on the land they hold in order to secure bor-POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 25, JANUARY 2009
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rowed money.68 Finally, CLRCs may contract with lenders or servicers and GSEs to provide 
upkeep and manage temporarily vacant properties for a fee. This is a signiﬁ  cant change from 
passive land banks, which could not independently pursue funding because of their status 
as government programs rather than independent corporations. 
IV. Conclusion
The reforms contained in the Land Bank Bill will modernize Ohio’s land banking model in 
several ways. The state’s passive land banks are not equipped to address the widespread 
vacant and abandoned housing problems plaguing many regions of Ohio. The Land Bank Bill 
enables land banks to organize at the county level as corporations directed by elected ofﬁ  -
cials and appointees. The prototype CLRC will act as a county-level repository for data, allow-
ing for regional evaluation of the vacant and abandoned housing problem.
The Land Bank Bill gives the new land banks operating budgets that are independent 
from municipal budgets without raising taxes. It encourages cooperation between CLRCs 
and municipalities. The Land Bank Bill also signiﬁ  cantly reduces the amount of time it takes 
for land banks to acquire vacant properties, expediting the properties’ return to the real 
property tax rolls. 
There are aspects of the Land Bank Bill that should be carefully observed and considered 
by policy makers. For example, the lack of temporary immunity from lawsuits based on the 
condition of the premises when it is acquired by a land bank exposes land banks to legal 
liability. Also, the funding process for CLRCs will redirect some penalties and interest on 
delinquent real property taxes and assessments from municipalities to CLRCs. This may have 
short-term implications for municipal budgets, despite the assistance CLRCs may provide 
to municipalities. Representatives from municipal and county governments should work 
closely together to determine the total ﬁ  nancial impact of CLRCs, taking into account both 
the municipal costs of funding CLRCs and the ﬁ  nancial beneﬁ  ts municipalities will reap 
from CLRC operations in both the short and long term.
Ultimately, the successful economic development of a region involves numerous factors, 
including workforce training, transit systems, taxes, and the business climate. The Land Bank 
Bill does not guarantee community stabilization or development. Rather, it establishes land 
banks as an effective tool for stabilizing and developing communities. It will allow a single, 
countywide entity to take clear title to distressed properties, expediting rehabilitation and 
development of these properties. It should encourage the acquisition of distressed proper-
ties by granting land banks speciﬁ  c immunities and allowing municipalities to avoid liability 
associated with distressed properties. 
 In sum, the Land Bank Bill addresses many of the challenges faced by the state’s tradi-
tional land bank model. The bill offers a well-rounded approach to solving the problems 
caused by excessive vacant and abandoned real property. The bill is designed to implement 
a pilot program in Cuyahoga County, an area that has been dramatically affected by vacant 
and abandoned real property. And, not insigniﬁ  cantly, the approach spelled out in the Land 
Bank Bill comes at a low cost because it requires no new property taxes or assessments to 
punctual taxpayers.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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